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Anonymity and the Supreme Court’s Model of Expression:
How Should Anonymity be Analysed Under Section 2(b) of
the Charter?
by Peter Carmichael Keen †

Introduction

anonymity has been demonstrated in a number of court
cases, in the context of adoption, where biological parents may wish to remain anonymous, 4 by witnesses who
wish to remain anonymous, 5 and by parties to cases
involving abortion. 6
The existence of laws that will have an impact on
anonymity is another reason to believe that claims will
be made that anonymity is constitutionally protected.
One example is the section 163.1 Criminal Code prohibition on possession and distribution of child pornography. Courts have already dealt with child pornography
prosecutions where the offending material has been distributed over the Internet. 7 The federal government is
currently trying to decide whether it should introduce
laws that would allow law enforcement agencies to
compel an ISP to disclose a user’s identity. 8 If an ISP was
ordered to disclose such information, and this led to the
prosecution of the user, the defendant could claim at
trial that the disclosure violated a right to anonymity. In
addition, governments have deliberately limited anonymity in other ways. Those lobbying the federal government are required to register themselves, and to disclose who they are lobbying and why, under the
Lobbyists Registration Act. 9 Breaches of the Act can be
punished by up to two years in prison, and by fines of up
to $25,000. 10 When such a breach is prosecuted, the
accused could defend the case by arguing that the limitation on anonymity is unconstitutional. Finally, federal
legislation currently allows an ISP to disclose personal
information about its users to the government. 11 If an
Internet user wanted to remain anonymous from the
government because he or she was criticising the government, and such information was disclosed, the user
might argue that this violated a right to anonymity.
Issues like the debate over anonymous expression on the
Internet, the prosecution of Internet related offences, and
legislative limitations on anonymity, means it is necessary to study whether anonymity is constitutionally protected under section 2(b) of the Charter.
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A

nonymity can be vital to free expression. History is
replete with examples of individuals who expressed
their viewpoints and faced ridicule, threats, torture or
death as a result. Early Christians, and many religious
groups since, had to practice their beliefs in secret, as
they faced persecution for publicly expressing their
views. People are likely to remain silent if they will be
harmed for speaking out. Anonymity encourages free
expression because it allows ideas to be publicly disseminated while shielding the speaker from the reactions of
those threatened by the ideas.
To date, only one Canadian decision has analysed
whether anonymity is constitutionally protected by the
right to free expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter). In a
perfunctory analysis of only a few paragraphs, the Alberta
Court of Queen’s Bench, in Harper v. Canada, 1 decided
that the ability to make anonymous political donations
was not protected under section 2(b). This ruling was
explicitly limited to the circumstances of that case and
the Court did not engage in an extensive analysis of
anonymous expression. Despite the lack of decisions to
date, there is a growing interest in anonymity, which
suggests that more constitutional claims will be made. A
debate is currently raging about whether anonymous
expression on the Internet should be protected. On one
side of the debate sit individual Internet users, who feel
safe in anonymously posting criticism on Internet billboards about companies or individuals they dislike. On
the other side sit individuals and corporations who have
been defamed by such criticism, and who seek limitations on anonymity because they want to be able to sue
the tortfeasor. 2 Often, Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
which provide Internet access to individual users, are the
only organisations that know who the users are. Courts
in both Canada and the United States have ordered ISPs
to disclose the names and addresses of users who have
engaged in alleged defamation. 3 Individual interest in
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The first part of this article will discuss what anonymity is, and the costs and benefits that anonymity
confers on expressive activity. I will demonstrate that
anonymity is a double-edged sword in that it can both
promote and harm free expression. In the second part, I
will suggest that there is no doubt that anonymity can be
protected under section 2(b) of the Charter. When I first
began this article, I intended to examine ‘‘whether’’ anonymity can be constitutionally protected under section 2(b). As my research progressed, I quickly realised
that I was asking the wrong question. I discovered that
section 2(b) has been interpreted so broadly by the
Supreme Court of Canada that there is no doubt that
anonymity can be protected in some circumstances.
However, since anonymity can harm free expression, and
since Charter analysis is contextual, a more interesting
and difficult question is how the courts will analyse anonymity in a particular factual circumstance. What conceptual framework is necessary for a reasoned analysis of
anonymity to take place?
In the third part of the article, I will consider the
case law under section 2(b) of the Charter. The objective
will be to determine whether the current approach
taken by the courts to section 2(b) can accommodate an
analysis of anonymity. The model of expression that has
developed in the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence (the jurisprudential model) will be discussed, and
will be compared with a basic model of communication,
which is taken from elementary communication theory
(the communication model). This study will reveal that
the jurisprudential model has developed beyond the
view in Irwin Toy v. Quebec that expression is made up
of form and content. It will also reveal that the jurisprudential model resembles an impoverished version of the
communication model. The comparison will demonstrate that the jurisprudential model is inadequate, and is
unable to accommodate a proper analysis of anonymity.
I will conclude by suggesting that the approach to
freedom of expression must be developed if anonymity
is to be properly analysed under section 2(b), and will
describe how this development should occur.

What is Anonymity?

B

efore we can consider when anonymity may be
protected under section 2(b) of the Charter, we first
need to understand what ‘‘anonymity’’ means, and why
anonymity is important.
Anonymity refers to identity knowledge. A person is
anonymous when he or she is ‘‘not named or identified’’:
when his or her identity is not known. 12 Having said
this, ‘‘identity’’ is not synonymous with ‘‘legal name.’’
Gary Marx identifies seven forms of identity knowledge:
(1) legal name, (2) locatability, (3) pseudonyms that can be
linked to legal name and/or locatability — literally a form of
pseudo-anonymity, (4) pseudonyms that cannot be linked to
other forms of identity knowledge — the equivalent of
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‘‘real’’ anonymity (except that the name chosen may hint at
some aspects of ‘‘real’’ identity knowledge), (5) pattern
knowledge, (6) social categorization, and (7) symbols of eligibility/noneligibility. 13

Helen Nissenbaum points out that ‘‘the value of
anonymity lies not in the capacity to be unnamed, but in
the possibility of acting or participating in society while
remaining out of reach, remaining unreachable.’’ 14
Where others do not know your identity, you are not
reachable. With this in mind, the importance of the
forms of identity knowledge becomes clear. Legal name,
when combined with locatability, means that a person is
known to others and is easily reachable.
When an individual interacts with society pseudonymously, the individual is identified by the pseudonym.
An example of pseudonymous interaction occurs in
Internet chat rooms, where individuals identify themselves by email addresses or other pseudonyms while
‘‘chatting.’’ To the extent that the pseudonym can be
linked to the individual’s legal name and location, he or
she is reachable. Depending on the extent of pseudonymity, a pseudonymous person can be faceless, sexless
and ageless, with no identifiable race; a being capable of
interacting with society without society knowing who it
is interacting with.
Pattern knowledge makes a person reachable to the
extent that the person can be located through the pattern. As Marx puts it, in ‘‘everyday occurrences (say,
riding the subway each day at 8 a.m.), we may come to
‘know’ other riders in the sense of recognising them.’’ 15
Social categorization identifies individuals through their
membership in some group (for example, VISA credit
card holders). Anonymity is limited to the extent that
others do not know who the members of the group are.
If, for example, the police do not know the legal identity
of a suspect, but know that the suspect holds a General
Motors (GM) VISA card, the police could obtain a list of
GM card holders, and use this as a starting point to track
down the suspect. Symbols of eligibility or non-eligibility, such as passwords to log-on to a computer network, allow persons to be identified with respect to particular activities. Those who are entitled to log-on are
distinguished from those who are not. Only when no
forms of identity knowledge exist with respect to an
individual can that individual be said to be perfectly
anonymous.

Anonymity exists in various degrees. Marx’s forms of
identity knowledge demonstrate that anonymity exists
in varying degrees. A person’s anonymity decreases as the
number of forms of identity knowledge increase. Certain
forms of anonymity are perfect, or nearly perfect, in the
sense that the anonymous individual’s identity can never
be discovered by others. A letter to the editor is a good
example: if you send an unsigned letter to the editor via
Canada Post through the physical mail with no return
address, it will be impossible (or nearly impossible) for
the editor or anyone else to discover your identity.
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Many forms of anonymity are imperfect. Individuals, who will be referred to here as ‘‘users’’, access the
Internet through Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Often,
these users adopt a pseudonym, and log on to the
Internet and interact with others under this pseudonym. 16 Each user’s computer has a unique Internet
protocol (IP) address, which is the electronic equivalent
of a physical mailing address. Whenever a user interacts
online with another user, their computers must
exchange IP addresses. This allows each computer to
send data to the other computer. Without knowing each
others’ IP addresses, the two computers could not communicate. If a user posts something on an Internet billboard under a pseudonym, the user’s IP address can be
recorded by the billboard host, and the IP address can be
retrieved. The IP address can be traced to the user’s ISP.
The ISP will usually have the information linking the IP
address to the user’s legal identity and physical address. If
a court orders the ISP to disclose the information, 17 the
user’s anonymity will be eliminated. While there are
methods of protecting anonymity, by using technologies
such as anonymous remailers, this technology is imperfect and can be broken. 18 As a result, it has been argued
that all anonymity on the Internet is a myth. 19 What this
means is that while a user maintains some degree of
anonymity by using a pseudonym, the user is anonymous only to the extent that the ISP cannot be forced to
disclose the user’s identity.

A corollary of anonymity existing in degrees is that
anonymity can be regulated in degrees. Regulators, when
deciding whether anonymity should be limited, are not
faced with a choice between completely eliminating, or
absolutely protecting anonymity. There is an ongoing
debate about whether governments should legislate to
protect Internet users from SLAPP suits. A SLAPP suit is
‘‘Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation’’, a law
suit brought by a corporation that is intended to ‘‘intimidate its critics into silence.’’ 20 The Internet has been
described as a ‘‘democratising’’ tool that gives the disenfranchised a voice because the Internet is a cheap and
efficient method of expressing ideas to the world. 21 It
allows individuals to criticise powerful entities such as
corporations. Individuals can post criticism on Internet
billboards at virtually no expense. SLAPP suits are likely
to silence such critics because individual Internet users
will not have the time or resources to fight such a suit,
regardless of its merits. Unfortunately, the Internet also
allows individuals to engage in irresponsible speech and
deliberate defamation. In HealthSouth Corp. v. John
Doe, which later became HealthSouth Corp v. Krum, a
disgruntled ex-employee of HealthSouth Corp posted
false information that the CEO of HealthSouth had
committed fraud. The employee also falsely stated that
he was having an affair with the CEO’s wife. 22 Internet
anonymity is a barrier to defamation and SLAPP suits
because users can only be sued if the corporation
bringing the suit can discover the alleged defamer’s identity.

In deciding whether and how to legislate with
respect to anonymity and SLAPP suits, governments
must balance interests in free expression against the
rights of corporations not to be defamed. Legislation
could be introduced that dictates when legal identity can
be disclosed by an ISP. The legislation could make it
difficult for ISPs to disclose a user’s legal identity, which
would protect anonymity. 23 The legislation could also
make it easy for ISPs to disclose legal identity, in which
case anonymity would be limited. The extent of the
protection or limitation on anonymity would depend on
the way the regulation was drafted, which shows that
anonymity can be regulated in degrees.

Anonymity only exists as an aspect of an underlying
interaction. 24 Anonymity does not exist in the abstract.
Since the extent of anonymity is a function of identity
knowledge, anonymity between two beings can only
exist when there is some direct or indirect interaction
between those two beings. Anonymity requires, at a minimum, one being’s awareness of the anonymous being’s
existence, which requires an interaction. If you have
never heard of a writer, or have had no interaction with a
writer, either directly (by reading one of the writer’s
works), or indirectly (by hearing about the writer from
some other source), it would be incorrect to describe the
writer as anonymous. Rather, he or she is unknown to
you. Only after some interaction takes place between
yourself and the writer, perhaps by your reading a review
about one of the writer’s books, can the writer be said to
be known to you. Anonymity will exist when you are
aware of the writer’s existence, but do not know any of
the forms of identity knowledge that could be used to
identify the writer. The most common interaction
involving anonymity is communication, which requires
expression.
The importance of anonymity varies with the
underlying expression. A person may decide to post
comments on an Internet billboard anonymously
because he or she fears retaliation about those comments. In such circumstances, anonymity is vital to the
expressive activity. When a person drives into a full-serve
gas station, asks for a fill-up, and pays using cash, the
transaction is anonymous to a degree, because the
driver’s legal identity is not known to the gas-station
attendant. The driver probably does not care one way or
another whether the attendant knows the driver’s legal
identity, so anonymity has no impact on this transaction.
Both the expresser and the receiver of a communication can be anonymous. The person who picks up a
book in the library can read anonymously unless he or
she takes the book out. The Supreme Court of Canada
has held that both expression and reception of information is protected by freedom of expression. 25 As such, in
any constitutional debate that considers anonymity, we
must be concerned both with expressers’ and receivers’
rights to anonymity.
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Anonymity may be a group or an individual characteristic. In mass media communications, the audience’s
anonymity is a group characteristic. 26 The expresser may
also be an anonymous group. When documentaries are
produced, hundreds of people may be involved in the
production. The message conveyed by the narrator may
be the product of the producer’s mind, the director’s
mind, the writer’s mind, or the TV station owner’s mind.
The author of the message is unknown to the audience,
though the medium through which the message is
expressed (the announcer) is visible. The message may
also be the product of a collaborative effort, in which
case the group is represented by the announcer, in a
form of pseudonymous anonymity. Constitutional protection for anonymity may protect both group and individual interests.
In communication, anonymity may be purposefully
relied upon, or it may arise necessarily. In some circumstances, anonymity will only exist if one party to a communication deliberately chooses to withhold his or her
identity, such as an Internet user placing a message on a
billboard, but choosing not to affix his or her name. In
other circumstances, anonymity must exist by the very
nature of the communication. The audience in mass
media communications is invariably anonymous. As an
example, the Webmasters of high-volume Web sites will
rarely know the identities of all those browsing their
Web sites because of the large number of visits. The
government could attempt to eliminate anonymity
where it arises necessarily in mass-media Internet communications, perhaps by requiring Web sites to record
all visits and disclose this information to the government.
Such an elimination could result in an Orwellian situation, where every person’s move in cyberspace is
recorded, and later reported to the state. Society’s liberty
interests may demand that anonymity in mass communications be protected.
Anonymity may be integral to a communication,
becoming part of the message being communicated, or it
may be distinguishable from, and tenuously linked to,
the message. When an infamous person decides to publish a political work representing a despised minority’s
view, and does so anonymously, the anonymity is a vital
part of that work. In hiding the writer, readers are less
likely to be influenced by biases they would normally
feel about that person. This influences the interpretation
of the work. The fact that it is published anonymously
may also be a subliminal message to the reader about the
work: ‘‘This work is so important and dangerous to those
in power that I, the writer, can not attach my name to it.’’
Where this occurs, anonymity becomes part of the content of the message. Anonymity may also be tenuously
linked to the communication. When the driver at the gas
station asks for gas, the transaction is the same, whether
the attendant is dealing with a ‘‘Sarah’’, or a ‘‘Denise.’’
We now have an understanding of what anonymity
is, but have not fully explored why it may be important
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to expression. To do this, we should examine the costs
and benefits that anonymity confers on expression,
before going on to conduct an analysis under section 2(b) of the Charter.

Costs and Benefits of Anonymity

M

any constitutional rights carry costs as well as benefits. The accused’s right to a fair trial, for example,
can be used to invade the privacy and equality rights of
victims. Individuals accused of sexual assault frequently
sought disclosure of the complainant’s therapy records in
order to gain information that could be used to challenge the credibility of the victim. 27 Complainants felt
that their privacy was being invaded by this, and that
they were being treated differently from other victims. 28
Rules which benefited the accused’s section 11(d )
Charter right to a fair trial were costs to the complainants’ Charter-protected privacy and equality rights. The
costs of the section 11(d ) right harmed different Charter
rights. The courts have held, in such cases, that the balancing of interests should occur under section 1 of the
Charter, rather than at the stage of considering the right
itself. 29 Anonymity is different, not because it has costs,
but because some of the costs and benefits of anonymity
are related to the same Charter right: freedom of expression. It is important to remember that freedom of expression protects ‘‘listeners as well as speakers’’, 30 and as we
will see, cases may arise where anonymity is a benefit to
the speaker, but is a cost to the listener, and vice versa.

Anonymity can both encourage and discourage
expression. Anonymous communication allows dissenting or unpopular opinions to be presented in circumstances where, if the speaker was known, he or she
would suffer embarrassment, oppression, arrest, torture
or even death. People who would not express themselves
if their identities were published may be willing to speak
anonymously. 31 By hiding identity, anonymity allows
individuals to place themselves beyond the reach of a
coercive state or other oppressive forces. 32 Where it is
dangerous or unpopular to express particular viewpoints,
anonymity encourages such expression. ‘‘Thomas Paine’s
Common Sense, acclaimed as the work which sparked
Americans to think about separating from Britain, was
first published signed simply ‘An Englishman’.’’ 33 If the
English government knew who the author was, Paine
might have faced reprisals. Minorities particularly benefit
from anonymity. In 1958, the Alabama state government
tried to force the NAACP to reveal the names of its
members. The racist overtones of that situation were a
serious threat to the group’s continued existence. In the
context of Ku Klux Klan bombings and other racially
motivated attacks, revealing the members of the association could have placed their lives at risk; hardly a conducive atmosphere to freedom of association and expression. Fortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
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NAACP’s refusal to release the names, which protected
the members’ anonymity. 34 If anonymity is limited, such
groups may be less willing to speak out.
Unfortunately, anonymity can also be used to discourage expression. Although hate-speech is prohibited
by law, 35 the law can be evaded by engaging in anonymous hate-speech. This hate-speech may discourage
members of the targeted group from expressing themselves. 36 Accordingly, it is inaccurate to assume that anonymity always benefits free expression, and we must
recognise that the effect anonymity has on expression
will vary in each case.
While anonymity can encourage expression, anonymity lowers the quality of expression. Anonymity
eliminates accountability and encourages irresponsible
expression. 37 While there is a massive amount of anonymous communication on the Internet, much of it has
little value, being no better than mindless gossip or innuendo. 38 Those criticising others are more likely to do so
responsibly if they have to identify themselves, because
their speech may have consequences. 39
Anonymity can both facilitate detection of crime,
and make it easier to evade detection. Witnesses to
crimes will be more willing to come forward when they
can do so anonymously, which is why ‘‘Crime Stoppers’’
is anonymous. Whistleblowers are more likely to expose
their employer’s negligence or illegality, if they can do so
without destroying their careers. 40 Unfortunately, anonymity also facilitates crime and other harmful behaviors. Online harassment has been identified as a growing
problem. 41 If an Internet user wishes to harass or make
threats to another user, the harasser can use anonymity
to avoid detection and prosecution.
Anonymity both improves and inhibits understanding. The understanding of any communication is
influenced by the perceptions of those receiving it. 42 By
shielding the identity of a writer, anonymity prevents a
reader’s pre-conceived notions about the author from
altering the reader’s reaction to a message. This is particularly useful for those who would be ignored if their
identity was known. Currer, Ellis and Acton Bell are
prime examples. 43 If the Brontës’ identities as women
had been known, their novels might never have been
published.
However, freedom of expression protects both
speakers and listeners, and anonymity can hamper a
reader’s ability to read critically. Our knowledge and
experience of a writer allows us to assess the writer’s
reliability and worth, so it is more difficult to trust anonymous writers. 44 In assessing information leaked from
the government by an ‘‘unnamed source’’, the public
would be better able to assess the value of the information if they knew whether it came from the prime minister’s mouth or a disgruntled backbencher who had just
been demoted from cabinet.
Anonymity encourages private communications,
but also makes them easier to abuse. Where an indi-

vidual wishes to seek help for a personal problem, privacy can be vital. If the individual is embarrassed about
the problem, he or she is unlikely to seek help if the
problem will become public knowledge. Privacy is an
important human need, and intimate personal communications are vital for human health. 45 Anonymity is
used to encourage individuals to engage in therapy, or to
receive medical attention. 46 As an example, governments
keep records of those suffering from communicable diseases, such as AIDS. In an effort to prevent the spread of
AIDS, governments released the medical status of AIDS
sufferers to their family, friends, employers, and past
sexual partners. Fear of this occurring has discouraged
people from taking AIDS tests, which, ironically, contributed to the spread of the disease. As a result, anonymous
AIDS tests are now widely available, and are frequently
used. Anonymity can be used to encourage private communications by bolstering confidentiality.
While anonymity can be used to protect an individual by ensuring their privacy, anonymity allows
others to engage in attacks by disguising their identity. In
the ‘‘Strange Case of the Electronic Lover’’, a male psychologist frequented an Internet chat-room, pretending
to be female. This pretence was a form of pseudonymous
anonymity. He used this to get female Internet users to
open up to him, and to discuss their problems. While
this psychologist was apparently able to help some of the
women, some of his victims felt betrayed when they
discovered his gender. 47 This suggests that while anonymity may encourage private communications, it may
also facilitate abuse. Fear of such abuse may discourage
therapeutic relationships.
We can see from this analysis that anonymity is a
double-edged sword. While anonymity may encourage
expression and communication, it can also have the
opposite effect. It may be correct to say that anonymity
will often promote expression, but it does not follow that
anonymity will always promote expression. Now that we
have examined the costs, benefits, and nature of anonymity, we should consider whether anonymity can be
protected under section 2(b) of the Charter.

Can Anonymity be Protected Under
Section 2(b)?

A

nonymity can be protected under section 2(b) of
the Charter. Historically, anonymity has been integral to the exercise of free expression, having been used
time and time again by people speaking out against
repressive regimes. 48 Section 2(b) protects all expression,
no matter how repulsive, including hate speech, solicitation for the purposes of prostitution, and pornography. 49
Much of this expression lies far from the core values
underlying section 2(b). Since anonymity has been used
to allow political expression, which lies at the very center
of these values, it seems intuitive that anonymity can fall
within the scope of section 2(b). A simple example con-
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firms this. Imagine that the Canadian government enacts
legislation stating that no criticism of the governing
political party can be published unless the author of the
criticism is identified, but that criticism of opposition
parties can be anonymous. In such a situation, the purpose of the legislation is to stifle criticism of the governing party, and to encourage criticism of the opposition. The underlying activity, political criticism, is
expressive, and the purpose of the legislation is to limit
free expression. It is difficult to imagine a court refusing
to find that the legislation was an unconstitutional limitation on free expression.
In my view, there is no doubt that anonymity can
be protected under section 2(b), so I will not discuss this
issue further here. 50 However, this does not help us
decide the more difficult question of whether anonymity
should be protected in a particular case. Constitutional
analysis requires a contextual approach, 51 and courts do
not deal with Charter rights in the abstract. A claim of
constitutional protection for anonymity may arise in any
number of situations: commercial Internet transactions
can occur anonymously; 52 individuals may post anonymous insults on an Internet billboard; a murderer may
select victims through online interactions, using anonymity to conceal his or her identity; a person may write
anonymous political leaflets. In each of these scenarios,
the interests at stake are different. It follows that the need
to protect anonymity will vary, depending on the circumstances of each case.
The remaining sections of this paper will address
the question of when anonymity should be protected
under section 2(b) of the Charter. The focus will be
entirely on how the courts should decide whether a
particular use of anonymity falls within the scope of
section 2(b) of the Charter, and whether a limitation on
anonymity violates section 2(b). I will not examine the
framework of analysis under section 1 of the Charter
because this analysis is highly contextual, depending
heavily on the facts of each case. 53 I am attempting to
suggest a general approach that could be used to analyse
anonymity under section 2(b). This is necessarily an
abstract question, making a consideration of section 1
difficult.

The Supreme Court’s Model of
Expression

F

reedom of expression has been constitutionally
enshrined in section 2(b) of the Charter, which protects ‘‘freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of
communication’’. 54 The objective of this article is to
determine how anonymity should be analysed under
section 2(b). To do this, it is first necessary to examine
the model of expression that has developed and grown
through the Supreme Court’s post-Charter freedom of
expression jurisprudence. In this model, expression is
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made up of components and actors, which are considered within an analytical framework.
The first components of expression recognised by
the Supreme Court of Canada can be found in Ford v.
Quebec. 55 The court held that language ‘‘is so intimately
related to the form and content of expression that there
cannot be true freedom of expression by means of language if one is prohibited from using the language of
one’s choice.’’ 56 In Irwin Toy v. Quebec, 57 Dickson C.J.
stated that expression ‘‘has both a content and a form,
and the two can be inextricably connected.’’ 58 Content is
the message to be conveyed. 59 Form was not defined, but
Dickson C.J. stated there are an ‘‘infinite variety of forms
of expression: for example, the written or spoken word,
the arts, and even physical gestures or acts.’’ 60 It seems
that form refers to the physical manner in which a message is conveyed. Thus, the Supreme Court’s earliest
jurisprudence suggested that expression was made up of
two components, form and content, which were inextricably linked. This has cast a shadow over much of the
jurisprudence and academic writing since, with many
jurists thinking of expression as if it were made up only
of form and content. As we will see, the Supreme Court
has moved beyond this primitive model.
Three more components have now been
recognised: time, medium and forum. The time at which
expressive activity occurs is identified in both Canadian
and U.S. jurisprudence, and is susceptible to regulation, 61
but there is no specific ‘‘test’’ in Canada that the courts
can apply to deal with limitations on ‘‘time.’’ This is not
surprising, as the courts have not needed to grapple with
a case concerning limitations on the times at which
expressive activity can occur.
If the form is the physical means through which
expression occurs, the medium is the method through
which the message is conveyed. 62 A written document
may be conveyed through the medium of a magazine,
printed in a book, sent by an email, or posted on a Web
site. While the Supreme Court of Canada has identified
‘‘medium’’ as an aspect of communication, 63 no analytical framework has been developed to determine when
limitations on a medium are constitutionally permissible. It is unclear, for example, how the courts will analyse state limitations on Internet use, such as the federal
government’s recent proposals that, if adopted, would
require Internet service providers to ‘‘develop or deploy
systems providing interception capability’’; essentially, to
allow wiretaps of email accounts. 64 As with ‘‘time’’, this is
probably because the court has not yet been faced with
arguments over a limitation on the use of a medium. 65
Forum has been identified as an aspect of expression in academic literature, 66 and has been the subject of
three Supreme Court of Canada decisions. These cases
will be discussed in some detail below, as they have
contributed significantly to the development of the analytical framework within which section 2(b) claims are
considered. 67

173
In addition to the components of expression, the
Supreme Court has recognised that freedom of expression can involve two actors, both of whom are deserving
of protection: those who create expression, and those
who receive it. Section 2(b) protects listeners as well as
speakers, readers as well as writers. 68
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Although freedom of expression had been considered in both Dolphin Delivery, 69 and Ford v. Quebec, 70
it was not until Irwin Toy that a framework for analysing
section 2(b) claims was developed. 71 The government of
Quebec had banned certain forms of advertising, at certain times of day, in order to protect children. Irwin Toy
advertised in a prohibited manner, and was charged. The
corporation defended the case, claiming the legislation
violated the corporation’s section 2(b) rights. The government responded by arguing that commercial speech did
not fall within the scope of section 2(b), that if it did,
section 2(b) was not violated, and if it was, the legislation
was saved under section 1.
Under the framework developed to address the
issues raised in Irwin Toy, the first step is to ask whether
the activity at issue falls within the scope of freedom of
expression. This will occur if the activity is expressive.
‘‘Activity is expressive if it attempts to convey a meaning.
That meaning is its content.’’ 72 Decisions since Irwin Toy
have confirmed that no matter how repugnant, ‘‘all content of expression’’ falls within the scope of section 2(b), 73 even hate speech, 74 obscene materials, 75 solicitation for the purpose of prostitution, 76 possession of
child pornography, 77 and commercial speech. 78
We cannot . . . exclude human activity from the scope of
guaranteed free expression on the basis of the content or
meaning being conveyed. Indeed, if the activity conveys or
attempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive content, and
prima facie falls within the scope of the guarantee. 79

Although all content is protected, an expressive
activity may fall outside the scope of section 2(b) if it
takes an impermissible form. So far, the Supreme Court
has held that the only form of expression which will
always fall outside the scope of section 2(b) is violence. 80
However, the meaning of ‘‘violence’’ encompasses only
physical violence. Speech that is intended to encourage
violence, such as hate speech, does not fall within this
exception. 81
If an activity falls within the scope of protection,
section 2(b) will be infringed if either the purpose or
effect of a state regulation or action is to limit freedom of
expression. 82 Where the state’s purpose is to limit expression by selecting between acceptable and unacceptable
content, section 2(b) will be automatically violated, and
the Charter analysis must proceed to section 1. This
means that every content-based restriction necessarily
has a purpose of limiting expression, which means every
content-based restriction violates section 2(b).
If the government’s purpose is to restrict the content
of expression by singling out particular meanings
that are not to be conveyed, it necessarily limits the
guarantee of free expression. If the government’s pur-

pose is to restrict a form of expression in order to control
access by others to the meaning being conveyed or to control the ability of the one conveying the meaning to do so, it
also limits the guarantee. On the other hand, where the
government aims to control only the physical consequences
of certain human activity, regardless of the meaning being
conveyed, its purpose is not to control freedom of expression 83 [emphasis added].

Where the effect of the state regulation or action is
to limit expression, section 2(b) will be infringed only
where the expressive activity promotes one of the ‘‘principles and values underlying the freedom.’’ 84 These principles are:
(1) Seeking and attaining the truth is an inherently good
activity; (2) participation in social and political decisionmaking is to be fostered and encouraged; (3) the diversity in
forms of individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing
ought to be cultivated in an essentially tolerant, indeed
welcoming, environment not only for the sake of those who
convey a meaning, but also for the sake of those to whom it
is conveyed. 85

Virtually any expressive activity could be said to
promote at least one of these principles. As such, under
the Irwin Toy approach, the finding that an activity falls
within the scope of section 2(b), combined with a
finding that the activity has been limited by state action,
will ordinarily lead to a conclusion that freedom of
expression has been violated.
Once a violation is found, the analysis proceeds to
section 1 of the Charter. As section 2(b) is so broad, most
balancing between free expression and other state and
societal interests occurs under section 1. In R v. Keegstra,
for example, limitations on hate speech were found to
violate section 2(b). It was under section 1 that the
Supreme Court balanced the interests of those targeted
by hate speech, the interest in free expression, and the
interest of society that its members be free from the
insidious and unwarranted attacks in hate speech. 86
Later cases confirmed that content-based restrictions
always violated section 2(b), though such restrictions
could be saved under section 1. 87 This approach means
the balancing process under section 1 is vital to freedom
of expression analysis. As so many factors may be considered, the section 1 analysis is highly contextual, varying
with the issues raised by each case.
There has been some development of the analytical
framework in the hate speech cases: Keegstra and
Zundel. In Keegstra, it was argued that hate-speech
should fall outside the scope of section 2(b) because the
targets of hate-speech would, because of the speech, be
afraid to express themselves. The Supreme Court held
that it should consider the detrimental effects of hate
speech under section 1, rather than at the scope stage of
analysis. 88 In Zundel, the court rejected an argument that
falsehoods should fall outside the scope of section 2(b),
holding that even deliberate lies may have expressive
value. 89 These cases suggest that the detrimental effects
of a speaker’s expression on a listener’s free expression
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rights should not be considered at the scope stage of
analysis.
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Since the Irwin Toy decision, and with the exception of Keegstra and Zundel, the section 2(b) analytical
framework has not developed extensively in cases where
the issue is a content-based restriction, such as the pornography and solicitation cases. This is because section 2(b) is so broad that the most significant analysis
took place under section 1. I do not suggest by this that
our understanding of section 2(b) has not developed in
content-based cases. The cases involving child pornography, obscenity, and commercial speech 90 have clarified
that the scope of section 2(b) is very broad, and they have
highlighted the difficult issues raised by different types of
speech. They have improved our understanding that
some types of expression lie near the core of section 2(b)’s values, and others lie far from it. 91 What I am
suggesting is that the basic framework of analysis, which
involves a consideration of section 2(b)’s scope and violation, has not significantly been altered by the contentbased cases.
The Supreme Court was forced to develop the
Irwin Toy analytical framework when it dealt with limitations on expression that were not based on content.
This development occurred in the public forum cases:
Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada, 92 and
Ramsden v. Peterborough City. 93 In Commonwealth, the
Supreme Court held that public political expression in
airports was constitutionally protected. 94 In Ramsden,
the court held that postering on public telephone poles
was also protected. 95 In both cases, the state prevented
expression not on the grounds that the particular speech
at issue was harmful, but on the basis that those expressing themselves could not do so in a particular public
location (public forum). While the issue was limited to
protection of forum, these decisions are the only ones
that have engaged in an in-depth analysis of limitations
that are not based on content. The framework that has
developed under the forum cases should be considered
when dealing with other non-content-based limitations.
As we will see later, anonymity should be regarded as a
non-content aspect of expression, so we will consider the
forum case law here.
The decision in Commonwealth, while unanimous
in the result, contained six separate opinions from a
panel of seven judges. These opinions contain three distinct approaches: those of Lamer C.J., McLachlin J. (as she
then was), and L’Heureux-Dubé J. Although none of the
approaches received the signatures of a majority of
judges, the reasons of Lamer C.J. and McLachlin J. disclose agreement on one point: some public forums can
be excluded from the scope of section 2(b). Together,
their judgments were supported by a majority of the
court, so this point is a binding precedent. This represents a move away from the traditional Irwin Toy
approach, under which all expressive activities fall within
the scope of section 2(b). Under Lamer C.J.’s approach,
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which was supported by two other judges, an expressive
activity in a public forum will fall within the scope of
section 2(b) when the activity is consistent with the
public forum’s function. As an example, Lamer C.J. suggests that picketing by blocking a major highway would
not fall within the scope of protection because picketing
in that place conflicts with the forum’s purpose, which is
to allow for traffic flow. McLachlin J., who was also supported by two other judges, held that ‘‘a threshold test is
required to screen out cases falling outside the free
speech guarantee before reaching the section 1 analysis.’’ 96 Under her approach, the use of a particular forum
for expressive activity will fall within the scope of section 2(b) in two circumstances: (1) when the government
restriction on forum-use is aimed at the content of
expression; (2) if the expression at issue promotes one of
the purposes underlying the freedom of expression guarantee. 97 We know from the cases involving contentbased restrictions on expression that if a public forum is
not involved, an expressive activity automatically falls
within the scope of section 2(b) merely because it is
expressive. This means that, in Justice McLachlin’s view,
the scope of section 2(b) can be limited by reducing the
forums available for expression.
L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s approach would have the use
of any public forum for any expressive activity fall within
the scope of section 2(b), even a public demonstration in
the Supreme Court Chambers. L’Heureux-Dubé J. resists
any narrowing of section 2(b), and she would balance
the Charter claimant’s interests with state interests
entirely under section 1. To this extent, she is in dissent.
In Peterborough City v. Ramsden, 98 the Court
refused to choose between the three Commonwealth
approaches. Despite this, Ramsden developed the analytical framework by clarifying that there is a two-step
approach to determining whether a non-content aspect
of an expressive activity falls within the scope of section 2(b):
Under Irwin Toy, supra, there are two basic steps in the
s. 2(b) analysis. First, one must determine whether the
activity at issue falls within the scope of s. 2(b). This f irst
step is itself a two-part inquiry. Does postering constitute expression? If so, is postering on public property protected by s. 2(b)? Under the second step of the
s. 2(b) analysis, one must determine whether the purpose or
effect of the by-law is to restrict freedom of expression 99
[emphasis added].

Cases considering free expression since Ramsden
have not developed the section 2(b) analytical framework. In R v. Guignard, 100 the Supreme Court was again
faced with a claim that a particular forum was protected,
but the Court did not address the jurisprudential dispute
within Commonwealth. We can see, then, that the analytical framework under section 2(b) is unclear with
respect to the scope of section 2(b), because of the three
different Commonwealth approaches.
One last comment should be made. The Supreme
Court of Canada has established a principle of content-
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neutrality in its free-expression analysis. The Court had
held, time and time again, that it is undesirable to place
content-based limits on expression. Free expression is
‘‘little less vital to man’s mind and spirit than breathing is
to his physical existence’’. 101 In a
free, pluralistic and democratic society we prize a diversity
of ideals and opinions for their inherent value to both the
community and to the individual. Free expression was for
Cardozo J. of the United States Supreme Court the matrix,
the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of
freedom 102 [internal quotes removed].

As John Stuart Mill has stated, it

✄ REMOVE

Username: bmorriso

Date: 31-JAN-05

Time: 7:34

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\02_03\keen.dat

Seq: 9

is as evident in itself, as any amount of argument can make
it, that ages are no more infallible than individuals; every age
having held many opinions which subsequent ages have
deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as certain that
many opinions now general will be rejected by future ages,
as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present. 103

For these reasons, the courts wish to avoid basing
constitutional protection on a judge’s perception of an
expressive activity’s value. The Irwin Toy approach is
completely content-neutral at the scope stage, and completely content-neutral at the violation stage when the
limitation on expression is purposeful. All content of
expression, no matter how repugnant, falls within the
scope of section 2(b), and every content-based limitation
on expression violates section 2(b). 104 This does not
mean that the value of expression is irrelevant to
whether the expression should be protected. Value has
always been relevant under section 1, where the interests
in expression are balanced with other state and societal
interests. Content-neutrality is most important at the
scope stage, and least important under section 1, because
the burden under section 2(b) lies on the individual,
whereas under section 1, the burden lies on the state. 105
It could be argued that considering value at the violation
stage is no more dangerous than at the scope stage,
because the burden still lies on the individual. The difficulty with this argument is that value is only relevant if
the violation is effects-based. As such, an individual may
never need to prove that the expression promotes one of
the section 2(b) values. For these reasons, it can be said
that the Supreme Court has established a principle of
content-neutrality, and this principle is most important
at the scope stage of section 2(b) analysis.
The components of expression and framework of
analysis allow us to identify a basic model of expression.
The model’s participants are listeners and speakers, and
expression is made up of the following components:
form, content, time, medium, forum and language.
There is no reason to believe that this list is exhaustive.
These components must be analysed as if they belonged
to one of two groups: ‘‘content’’ or ‘‘non-content.’’ The
content group contains those aspects of expression that
are the message to be conveyed. The non-content group

contains those aspects of expression that are not the
message to be conveyed; form, forum, time, medium,
and language. This grouping is required because the
Irwin Toy framework requires courts to analyse content
based limitations differently from non-content based
limitations. All content automatically falls within the
scope of section 2(b), regardless of its value, and contentbased limitations always violate section 2(b) of the
Charter. We see this from the treatment, referred to
earlier, of obscene materials, hate-speech, child-pornography and solicitation. Non-content aspects of expression
do not automatically fall within the scope of section 2(b),
as we see from the violence exception and the publicforum cases. The original model, in which expression
was regarded as being made up of form and content, is
no longer accurate, so jurists should avoid thinking of
expression in these terms.
The question we are considering is how the courts
should analyse anonymity at the scope and violation
stages of the section 2(b) analysis. The model of expression currently in existence poses several problems. Anonymity can be so closely linked to the message to be
conveyed that it becomes part of that message, but it can
also be tenuously linked to an expressive activity. If we
conduct a traditional Irwin Toy analysis, it seems that we
have to categorise it. But as what? Content? Non-content? Both? Neither? We also know that in some circumstances, anonymity may actually discourage expression.
Yet the hate-speech cases suggest that even if an expressive activity does discourage expression, it still falls
within the scope of section 2(b). Does this mean that
anonymity will always be protected, even when it undermines free expression? Should the public forum
approach, which excludes some forums from the scope
of section 2(b), be extended to include anonymity? But
how would this work?

A Model Provided By
Communication Theory

B

efore deciding how to analyse anonymity, we
should first evaluate the strengths and weaknesses
within the Supreme Court’s model. We will then be in a
position to try and determine how the case law should
be developed to accommodate anonymity. In conducting this analysis, it will be useful to compare the
Supreme Court’s model of expression with another
model — that provided by communications theory.
Several models of communication have been developed by communication theorists, though most share
some basic characteristics. One diagrammatic model,
which is frequently used to describe the communication
process, is reproduced as figure 1, below. 106
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Figure 1: A Basic Model of Communication

This basic model describes communication as a
symbolic process, in which a source (the person wishing
to communicate), produces a message to be communicated, with the intent of producing some effect on the
destination. The message is ‘‘encoded’’, which means it is
converted into symbols, which are a form suitable for
transmission. The message is then transmitted through
the channel (or medium) of communication. After transmission, the message is received by the destination,
which is the person for whom the communication is
intended. Reception is not enough for communication
to occur, 107 and should not be equated with understanding. The destination must decode the message
before it can be understood. For successful communication, the message must be decoded in such a way that
the message means the same thing that it did before it
was encoded. This means that both the source and the
destination must share the same understanding of the
symbols. I will illustrate this process using a simple
dinner conversation as an example, before explaining the
model further.
The information source is a dinner guest who wants
her host (the destination), to pass the salt. The guest’s
brain produces the message, but the thoughts produced
by the brain cannot be understood or even recognised
by the host. The dinner guest’s brain encodes the message by ordering the guest’s mouth and voice box to
produce the sound pattern; ‘‘Would you please pass the
salt.’’ The sounds ‘‘Would you please pass the salt’’, are
symbols representing the actor (‘‘you’’, which refers to
the host), the action (passing), and the subject of the
action (salt). The words also contain symbols that identify the communication as a polite request (Would you
please), rather than an order. The channel of communication is air molecules, which transmit sound through
vibration. When the guest’s voice box produces the
words, they are transmitted through the air as sound

waves. Reception occurs when the sound enters the
host’s ears, causing the eardrum to vibrate. The message
is then decoded by the host’s brain, which interprets the
electrical impulses produced by the vibration of the eardrums. Only then has communication occurred. The
communication will only be successful if both the source
and receiver share an understanding of the symbols
involved. Both must be able to hear sounds, and both
must recognise that the sound ‘‘salt’’ represents the salt
shaker on the table.
As the model indicates, communication involves
more than merely the preparation, encoding, transmission and decoding of a message. Communication occurs
in a context; will not be successful unless both the source
and destination share fields of experience; involves feedback; and can be distorted by noise.
Communication is said to occur within a context
because the same symbols can mean different things in
different circumstances. The words ‘‘I had a rough day
today’’ have completely different meanings to an office
worker who speaks to a colleague at the bar, and to a
soldier who is reporting to a superior officer about a
battle involving many casualties. Context may be
required before the message can be properly understood.
Communication cannot occur unless the source
and destination share fields of experience. 108 At its most
basic level, this means that the source and destination
must assign the same meaning to the same symbols.
Both parties must speak the same language to be able to
communicate. There are many fields of experience, however, and fields of experience may overlap imperfectly.
While this paper is written in English, this does not
mean that every person who can read English will be
capable of comprehending this article. The article
assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of
Canadian constitutional law, and knows that laws that
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conflict with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms may be of no force and effect. If a reader’s field of
experience does not include this knowledge, this article
may be misunderstood.
Feedback is transmitted from the destination to the
source, and tells the source whether the message is being
decoded and interpreted as the source intended it to be.
We receive feedback both from our destination, and
from our messages. 109 As an example, if the dinner guest
was tired, and said ‘‘sugar’’, rather than salt, he or she
might hear this and correct the message. In our simple
example, feedback might occur by the host passing the
salt, which would indicate that the message had been
understood. If the host responded by passing the sugar,
this feedback would indicate that the message had been
misunderstood. Feedback means that in most, if not all
communication, parties are sender-receivers, 110 with
both parties simultaneously sending and receiving
messages. When a person speaks to another, the speaker
evaluates his or her words through the reactions of the
listener. Even where the sender is not present, we perceive our own messages, and may alter the content based
on our perceptions. As I edited this paper, I spotted the
occasional spfelling mistoike, and corrected it accordingly. As communication is a transactional process, not
merely a discrete act on the sender’s part, both sender
and receiver influence the content of communication.
Communication theory predicts what our analysis of
anonymity has revealed — that both speakers and listeners have an impact upon the meaning of expression.
The model of communication theory recognises
that communication is distorted by ‘‘noise.’’ The concept
of noise was first introduced by Claude E. Shannon and
Warren Weaver in The Mathematical Theory of Communication. 111 ‘‘Noise,’’ which is also described as ‘‘interference’’ by some communication theorists, refers to anything that interferes with the communication process.
Noise can affect any stage of the communication process,
including encoding, transmission or decoding. The simplest example of noise is physical noise that interferes
with the transmission of a message, such as static on the
telephone. Noise is not limited to physical noise, however. In a courtroom, noise might be the sight of a prosecutor walking around with his or her fly undone. A juror
might be so distracted by this that the juror doesn’t hear
anything the lawyer says.
Noise also refers to interference with encoding or
decoding, which may occur when the source and destination do not share fields of experience. 112 If a person
writes ‘‘insert the USB cable into the USB port,’’ noise
occurs when the destination has no idea what a USB
cable or port is. Encoding and decoding can also be
distorted by the noise of biases, perceptions and stereotypes. As an example of how perception can affect communication, in some Canadian First Nations cultures, it
is a sign of respect for an inferior (in age, education, or
experience) not to look a superior in the eye while communicating. An inferior should keep making eye contact,
as this demonstrates that the inferior is listening to what
the superior is saying, but eye contact should be brief,
and should be quickly broken off, only to be re-estab-

lished later. However, in Anglo-Canadian culture, such
behaviour is perceived to be a sign that someone is lying.
Anglo-Canadians are more likely to believe someone
who speaks confidently while looking them in the eye.
As a result, it has been suggested that members of the
First Nations are at an inherent disadvantage when
being tried by Anglo-Canadian judges and jurors.
Demeanor that was intended by a First Nations witness
to be a respectful attitude towards the lawyers and judge
during questioning is likely to be interpreted by the
Anglo-Canadian judge or juror as a sign that the witness
is unable to speak the truth. 113
Meaning is more than a dictionary definition, and
the meaning ascribed to a message by the information
source is not necessarily the same as the message understood by the receiver. Different destinations may understand the same message differently, because of how they
perceive and decode the symbols. As an example, the
meaning of a work of literature may differ depending on
who is reading it. George Orwell’s Animal Farm might
be interpreted by a ten-year old as a rather bizarre story
about a farm. Most adults are capable of recognising that
the book is an anti-communist allegory. This means that,
to some extent, meaning exists within the participants to
communication. 114 Richard Moon has recognised this in
analysing freedom of expression, pointing out that the
‘‘activities of speaking and listening are interdependent;
they are part of a process and a relationship. The interests
of the speaker and listener are realized in the joint
activity of creating meaning.’’ 115
Something that I have not included in the model
being discussed here, but which is included in many
models provided by communication theorists, is that
communication has, and is intended to have, some effect
on the destination of the message. 116 When you issue an
order to a dog, for example, telling it to ‘‘sit’’, the communication hopefully has the effect of making the dog
sit down.
From the above discussion, we can see why communication is thought of by communications theorists as a
process, rather than a singular, discrete event in time. 117
Although the model separates sources from destinations,
encoding from decoding, the model recognises that each
of these components of communication are linked.
‘‘Objects which we separate may not always be separable,
and they never operate independently — each affects
and interacts with the others.’’ 118
Now that we have examined an alternative model
of expression, we should compare this with the Supreme
Court’s model of expression, and criticise that model.

Criticising the Supreme Court’s
Model of Expression

T

he similarities between the Supreme Court’s model
of expression and the model provided by communication theory can be summarised as follows. The foundation of expression and communication is generally the
same: conveying a message. In the model of expression,
the message is contained in some ‘‘form,’’ and is con-
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veyed through a medium. In communications theory,
the ‘‘form’’ is the process of encoding the message into
symbols, and the message is also conveyed through a
medium (or channel). The model of expression
recognises that both speaking and listening are components of free expression, while communication theory
suggests that communication is a transactional process,
involving both sources and receivers. To this extent, the
models are largely the same, simply using different terminology. One difference, however, is that the model of
expression includes expression that is not intended to be
communicated. 119
The reason why the model of expression resembles
a model of communication is explained by the rationales
underlying section 2(b). In R v. Keegstra, 120 McLachlin J.
(as she then was) identified three generally accepted justifications for free expression. The first was the political
process rationale: that free expression is ‘‘instrumental in
promoting the free flow of ideas essential to political
democracy and the functioning of democratic institutions.’’ 121 The second was that freedom of expression is
‘‘an essential precondition of the search for truth. . . .
Freedom of expression is seen as a means of promoting a
‘marketplace of ideas,’ in which competing ideas vie for
supremacy to the end of attaining the truth.’’ 122 The
third rationale was that ‘‘free expression is an end in itself
. . . All persons have the right to form their own beliefs
and opinions, and to express them [for] expression is an
integral part of the development of ideas, of mental
exploration and of the affirmation of the self’’ [internal
quotes omitted]. 123 The model of expression resembles
the model of communication because the first two rationales can generally only be realised if communication
occurs.
The key differences between the models are that the
Supreme Court’s model regards expression as a discrete
event, whereas communication theory sees communication as a process. The court does not recognise the links
between listeners and speakers at the section 2(b) stage of
analysis. 124 Nor does the model consider the links
between actors and components, and the relationship
between components at this stage. The Supreme Court
focuses only on one aspect of expression, the interests of
the rights-claimant, to the exclusion of all others. As an
example, in cases involving freedom of the press to
report on court cases, the court focuses solely on the
interests of the rights claimant (the media), at the section 2(b) stage of analysis. The privacy rights of witnesses
are only considered during the section 1 stage of analysis.
The same is true in all cases involving content-based
limitations on expression. 125 As a result, the model looks
like this at the section 2(b) stage:
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Figure 2: A Diagram of the Supreme Court’s
Model of Expression at the Section 2(b) Stage of
Analysis

As we can see, this hardly deserves to be called a
model at all. It is only during section 1 that the Court
considers all aspects of expression, taking into account
the interests of both speakers and listeners. Only then
does the model of expression come close to resembling
the model of communication, and it could be presented
in diagrammatic form as follows:
Figure 3: Diagram of the Supreme Court’s Model
of Expression at the Section 1 Stage

We can see that the model at the section 1 stage
seems to be an impoverished version of the model provided by communication theory. If the communication
theory model were applied at the section 2(b) stage, this
would require a different approach to the questions of
scope and violation. Communication theory views communication as a process, which means that you need to
look at the relationships between speaker and listener,
and the processes of encoding and decoding, to determine what happens during communication. We cannot
analyse communication merely by focusing on one
aspect, such as the listener. Hence, if this model was
used, we would have to consider all the aspects of expression, and the impact on the listener, before determining
whether the expression in issue fell within the scope of
section 2(b), and whether section 2(b) was violated. Does
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this difference suggest that the Supreme Court’s model
of expression is flawed? I believe that it does.

interacted in this online environment because you could
not face leaving your apartment.

The first problem is that a failure to consider the
relationship between speakers and listeners at the section 2(b) stage opens the way to ruling that an expressive
activity falls within the scope of section 2(b) even when
the net effect of that activity is to undermine expression.
Richard Moon argues that free expression is really
intended to protect communication, and that communication is a process, with meaning being created by both
speakers and listeners. He states that some forms of
expression, such as deceit, intimidation, or manipulation
involve ‘‘a significant abuse of the communicative relationship.’’ He points out that such harm tends to be
analysed under section 1, despite the fact that it seriously
undermines the relationship of communication. 126 I do
not want to debate whether freedom of expression is
intended to protect communication. However, I do want
to expand upon Moon’s point that one person’s expression can harm another person: Not only can one
person’s expression harm another (a racial insult, for
example), one person’s expressive activity can harm
another person’s expressive activity. To demonstrate this,
the next paragraph summarises a real life example
described by Julian Dibbell in his article ‘‘A Rape in
Cyberspace.’’ 127

In this example, Bungle’s acts constituted a form of
non-violent expression, but they completely undermined
the victims’ expressive activities. By taking over the characters controlled by other users, Bungle eliminated those
users’ abilities to express themselves. If the MUD had
been operated by a governmental body, the decision to
remove Bungle from the game would have engaged the
Charter. You may think that such a scenario is far
fetched, but in fact, governments have created online
environments that allow users to interact, and contain
mechanisms to expel undesirable users. 129 The current
approach to section 2(b) of the Charter suggests that the
only person’s interests that could be considered under
section 2(b) would be those of the rights-claimant (in this
example, Bungle). But this approach would result in
Bungle’s activities falling within the scope of section 2(b),
even though his activities undermined the freedom of
expression interests of his victims. If Bungle only used
the MUD rarely, but his victims used it frequently, and
they all stopped using the MUD because of the attacks,
the net effect of Bungle’s activity would be to reduce
expressive activity. Despite this, the current approach
taken by the Supreme Court would require that Bungle’s
expression fall within the scope of section 2(b), because it
fails to take into account the interests of both listeners
and speakers at the scope stage of analysis.

On the Internet, some people interact through
online environments called MUDs (multi-user dimensions). A MUD is essentially an online world with many
different parts, each of which is called a room. Internet
users can create a character whom they maneuver
through this environment by moving between rooms.
Users type a message into the computer, which can be
read by all users who are in the same room. This is a
form of pseudonymous interaction. Individuals may do
this for fun, or to meet people without having to deal
with the pressures and unconscious stereotypes raised in
a face-to-face meeting. In one of these MUDs, a user
controlled a character named ‘‘Mr. Bungle’’ (I will refer to
the user as Bungle, and will assume that he was male).
Bungle sexually abused other characters against their
users’ wills. He did this by using a computer program
which gave him the ability to write messages and attribute them to another character. For example, Bungle
might write ‘‘Go away’’, and it would appear on a computer screen under the name of another character. The
attacks (that is, the messages that Bungle wrote), were
particularly unpleasant. In one, Bungle forced a female
character to ‘‘[jab] a steak knife up her ass, causing
immense joy.’’ While you might say ‘‘so what, it’s only a
game, and these are only words,’’ these online events had
a real-world impact. One of the victims of this attack
later wrote some fairly vituperative comments about
Bungle, and while writing this, ‘‘post-traumatic tears
were streaming down her face’’. The other users eventually removed Bungle from the environment. 128 If you feel
that maybe the victim in this case was overreacting, you
should remember that words can have a physical impact.
Think about how a member of an ethnic minority
might react to racial remarks. Imagine how you would
feel if you were a victim of a real-life sexual assault, who

By focusing only on the interests of the rightsclaimant at the section 2(b) stage, the court ignores the
effect of noise on the production of expression. In communication theory, understanding noise, and how to
reduce noise, is essential to understanding how to successfully communicate. The court has recognised that
noise exists, in recognising that hate-propaganda can
influence the views of society’s members. 130 Hate-speech
creates biases, and in communication theory, biases are a
form of noise. Despite this, the effect of noise is only
considered relevant during a section 1 analysis, because
this is the only stage at which the biases created by hate
speech can be considered. 131 While this may be justifiable in the context of hate-speech, it may not be appropriate in other contexts.
The nature, costs, and benefits of anonymity
demonstrate that anonymity impacts expression in a
number of different ways. The double-edged nature of
anonymity means that anonymity can either harm or
help expression. If the courts follow Keegstra, and only
consider the detrimental aspects of anonymity under
section 1 of the Charter, this could lead to a situation
where anonymity undermines expression, but must still
be protected under section 2(b). This suggests that the
adverse aspects of anonymity should be considered at
the section 2(b) stage, to determine whether it has an
adverse effect on free expression, and how serious this
adverse effect is. If anonymity merely influences, but
does not significantly harm the expressive activity, we
might not be too concerned, but if the noise caused by
anonymity is so severe that it makes it impossible to
engage in an expressive activity, it would be foolish to
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allow that aspect of anonymity to fall within the scope of
section 2(b). As an example of how this might occur,
some expression is statutorily barred from being anonymous. Ontario legislation requires that testamentary
instruments be witnessed by two people, and that the
witnesses subscribe to the will. 132 This is done for two
reasons. First, so that at probate, the court can be sure
that the testator was not coerced into signing the will,
and that the person signing the will was the testator.
Second, so that the parties involved can contact those
witnesses in the event of concern regarding issues such as
testamentary capacity. This legislation prevents wills
from being made anonymously, or from being witnessed
anonymously, but it would be absurd to suggest that this
limits expression. The identity of the testator must be
known to give effect to the testator’s act of expression in
making the will. If you don’t know the testator’s identity,
the will is useless. Knowing who the witnesses are is vital
if the will is challenged. If either the testator or witnesses
were allowed to be anonymous, this would create noise
by preventing listeners (those reading the will), from
assessing the source, completely undermining the expression involved. Accordingly, noise, and the detrimental
effects that anonymity has on expression, must be considered at the scope stage of section 2(b) analysis. This
does not mean that all detrimental effects of anonymity
should be considered at the scope stage of analysis. For
example, where a witness is anonymous, this may
adversely impact an accused person’s fair trial rights. The
detrimental effect here is relevant not to expression, but
to another Charter right, so there is no reason to consider this at the s. 2(b) stage. It could better be considered
under section 1.
Although most case law suggests that noise and the
relationship between speaker and listener should be
ignored at the section 2(b) stage, this limitation is not
absolute. Violence has been excluded from the scope of
section 2(b). At first glance, this exclusion seems to lack a
theoretical foundation, and cannot be reconciled with
the refusal to exclude other socially harmful forms of
expression. 133 However, the violence exception can be
justified if the relationship between listeners and
speakers is relevant to the scope of section 2(b). An act of
violence may express the actor’s feelings, but also represents a denial of the listener’s interests. 134 If the relationship between the listener and speaker was never relevant
at the section 2(b) stage of analysis, there is no theoretical
justification for excluding violence.
The Supreme Court requires us to analyse content
and non-content aspects of expression differently. Communication theory suggests this is flawed. Communication theory views communication as a process, in which
all the components of communication interact to produce meaning. Sources cannot be separated from destinations or the other aspects of communication, such as
encoding, decoding, medium and noise. However, this
view is not always accurate. In some cases, the noncontent aspects of expression have little or no impact on
the message to be conveyed. As an example, time is a
non-content aspect of expression, and is usually tenuously linked to meaning. Whether a play begins at
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8:00 p.m. or 8:30 p.m. has no impact on the play’s
meaning. However, in some cases, as communication
theory predicts, you cannot separate the content and
non-content aspects of expression. When this occurs, it
becomes unclear which method of analysis should be
applied. 135 The strength of the link between the content
and non-content aspects of expression varies from case to
case, and ostensibly non-content aspects can actually be
the message to be conveyed. As an example, time is a key
aspect of the two minutes of silence which occurs at
11:00 a.m. on Remembrance Day (the same hour that
the First World War ended). On Remembrance Day,
time is content, as it is a key part of the message to be
conveyed.
In summary, the model provided by communication theory suggests the Supreme Court’s model suffers
from the following flaws: It fails to consider the links
between listeners and speakers at the section 2(b) stage of
analysis, with the result that a rights-claimant’s expressive
activity will fall within the scope of section 2(b), even
when this activity undermines the expressive interests of
others; it requires noise to be considered under section 1,
even if noise undermines expression; it requires us to
divorce the content of expression from the components
of expression, which is difficult when the components of
expression are inextricably interlinked with the content;
and it means the method of analysis is not clear when
the content and components of expression are interlinked. Having considered these difficulties, we should
now go on to consider whether the current framework
can accommodate anonymity.

The Current Framework is Unable
To Accommodate Anonymity

T

he Supreme Court has recognised different components of expression as they have arisen, and there is
no reason why the model of expression should prevent
anonymity from being similarly recognised.
If the traditional Irwin Toy analysis is applied, anonymity will be thought of as a non-content aspect of
expression. Non-content aspects of expression (form,
forum, time, medium and language), all share one characteristic: Ordinarily, they have no meaning unless
attached to some message to be conveyed. The same can
be said for anonymity, which cannot exist in the abstract.
Anonymity can be tenuously linked to expression, and
in many cases, will not be central to what the speaker
wishes to say. Accordingly, we should examine anonymity as if it were a non-content aspect of expression.
The only case law that specifically examines how a
non-content aspect of expression should be analysed are
the public forum cases. We should look to this case law
for guidance, and attempt to extract the basic principles
that will likely be applied to anonymity. Can anonymity
be accommodated by the two-step Ramsden approach,
and the three Commonwealth approaches? I will argue
that the Ramsden approach will have to be modified if it
is to be applied to anonymity, and that none of the
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Commonwealth approaches could be successfully
adopted.
If the two-step Ramsden approach was applied to
anonymity without alteration, it would read as follows:
(1) Does the activity constitute expression? (2) If so, is the
anonymous expressive activity protected by section 2(b)?
The first question poses no difficulties. If anonymity is
not linked to an expressive activity, expression is not
involved, so anonymity could not be protected by section 2(b). 136 The difficulty lies in applying the second
Ramsden question, which asks whether the activity as a
whole should be protected under section 2(b), but does
not separately consider the content and non-content
aspects. This has the effect of conflating the issues of
whether the content should be protected with whether
the non-content aspect of expression should be protected. The question does not ask whether ‘‘anonymity’’
falls within the scope of section 2(b), but whether the
‘‘anonymous-expressive-activity’’ is protected. This
ignores the strength of the link between anonymity and
content. The strength of this link exists on a continuum.
At the weak-link end of the continuum, anonymity is
irrelevant to the content, is distinguishable from the
expression, and has no impact on whether the expression occurs. Anonymity may even harm expression. At
the strong-link end, anonymity may be so closely related
to the content of a message that the anonymity becomes
part of the content. 137 If anonymity harms expression, or
is so weakly linked to the content that it has no impact
on the expression, there is no reason why the anonymous aspect should fall within the scope of section 2(b).
However, if the anonymous aspect has no impact on the
expression, the answer to the second Ramsden question,
as it is currently phrased, must always be that anonymity
should be protected. This is because the underlying
activity is expressive, so the ‘‘anonymous-expressiveactivity’’ must also be expressive. But why should anonymity receive constitutional protection under section 2(b), if it has no impact upon whether expression
occurs? I do not suggest by this that the underlying
expression should not be protected, but there is no
reason for the anonymous aspect to be protected in such
a case. A failure to consider the strength of the link could
give constitutional protection to anonymity when doing
so is completely unnecessary.
The two-step Ramsden approach will also not work
when anonymity and the underlying expression are so
strongly linked that anonymity is part of the content.
Where anonymity is content, the anonymous aspect is
itself expressive. Irwin Toy holds that all expression, no
matter how repulsive, falls within the scope of section 2(b), which means that a two-step approach would
be unnecessary. All this suggests that the two-step
Ramsden approach cannot be applied to anonymity
without modification.
Anonymity cannot be accommodated under any of
the Commonwealth approaches, as they all suffer from
the same flaw. All the approaches, if applied to anonymity, fail to consider the strength and importance of
the link between anonymity and content in the section 2( b ) analysis. McLachlin J. and Lamer C.J.’s

approaches also have the effect of violating the principle
of
contentneutrality. Their decisions indicate that the scope of section 2(b) does not include all non-content aspects of
expression. This means that the scope of section 2(b) can
be limited by reference to the non-content aspect. The
principle of content-neutrality requires the content of
expression to be irrelevant at the scope stage. Thus, content-neutrality suggests that when dealing with anonymous expression, a limitation on the scope of section 2(b) should be based solely on the anonymous (noncontent), aspect of the expression. Unfortunately, an
ostensibly non-content limitation on anonymous expression will be a content-based limitation when the anonymous aspect of expression is so closely linked to the
message that anonymity becomes part of the message.
Lamer C.J.’s approach is specific to forum and it is
difficult to see how this approach could be applied to
anonymity. His approach can be additionally criticised
on the basis that it is only content-neutral when the
forum and the content of expression are clearly separable. The use of a particular forum may be integral to an
expressive activity. Imagine, for example, a play that is
written and designed to be performed in a particular
public place, such as by the Tomb of the Unknown
Soldier in Ottawa. The playwright may have written the
play using imagery that requires the presence of the war
memorial for the imagery to be understood. In such a
circumstance, the forum is integral to the expressive
activity, and separating questions of forum and content is
impossible. Lamer C.J.’s approach categorises certain
forums as unavailable for free expression, which eliminates the need to consider on a case-by-case basis
whether the forum is integrally linked to the expression.
If this approach were applied to anonymity, this would
violate the principle of content-neutrality whenever anonymity is content. For these reasons, Lamer CJ.’s
approach could not and should not be adapted to
accommodate anonymity.
McLachlin J.’s approach requires a consideration of
the expression’s value at the scope stage of section 2(b),
which expressly violates the principle of content-neutrality. This approach requires the court to make a value
judgment about the expression, making a judge’s perception of the expression relevant to constitutional protection. This approach is entirely inconsistent with previous
decisions that held that all expression, no matter how
repugnant, should fall within the scope of section 2(b). 138
McLachlin J. feels that some forms of expression, such as
a demonstration within the Supreme Court Chamber,
would not fall within the scope of section 2(b). It is
unclear how her test could be objectively applied to take
such an activity out of the scope of s. 2(b). 139 Why would
a demonstration in the Supreme Court chamber not
promote one of the values underlying section 2(b), if a
similar demonstration in an airport would? What this
approach really does is replace an objective analysis of
the activity under section 2(b) with a subjective opinion
about whether a particular place is appropriate for free
expression. If Justice McLachlin’s approach were applied
to anonymity, the anonymous activity would only fall
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within the scope of section 2(b) if it promoted one of the
values underlying section 2(b). As anonymity can be content, this would directly violate the principle of contentneutrality. Her approach could also protect an anonymous aspect of expression when that aspect actually
harmed the expressive activity. We have seen that the
anonymous aspect of an expressive activity can undermine free expression. Where this occurs, the anonymous
aspect of expression would still fall within the scope of
section 2(b), provided the expression as a whole promoted a section 2(b) value. For these reasons, McLachlin
J.’s approach should not be adopted to deal with anonymity.
L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s approach in Commonwealth
upholds the principle of content-neutrality, but if it were
applied without modification to anonymity, it could
attack free expression. If her approach were used, an
anonymous activity will always fall within the scope of
section 2(b) provided the activity is expressive. Unfortunately, anonymity can undermine expressive activity, in
which case protecting it under section 2(b) would harm
free expression. Another difficulty with adopting
L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s approach is that it was rejected by
the majority of judges in Commonwealth.
In dealing with the scope stage of the analytical
framework, the problems with each of the Commonwealth approaches suggest that none of them should be
adopted for anonymity. None of the approaches are
binding because none represents a majority opinion.
Having said this, three principles emerge from the case
law which, as they are supported by a majority of judges,
are likely to be adopted in dealing with anonymity. The
first principle is content-neutrality, which was adopted in
Irwin Toy, and has only been deliberately attacked by
McLachlin J. in Commonwealth. The second principle,
found in Ramsden, is that a two-step approach should be
used to determine whether a non-content aspect of
expression falls within the scope of section 2(b). The first
step focuses on whether the underlying activity is expressive, and the second step takes into account the noncontent aspect. The third principle is that while section 2(b) protects all content of expression, no matter
how repulsive, non-content aspects of expression can fall
outside the scope of section 2(b). This principle can be
extracted from the violence exception, and from the
judgments of Lamer C.J. and McLachlin J. in Commonwealth. This means that future courts will be permitted
to exclude anonymity from the scope of section 2(b) in
some circumstances. In dealing with the violation of section 2(b), the general Irwin Toy approach has never been
overruled or challenged, which means it will likely be
followed in dealing with anonymity. Now that we have
established the principles that apply in analysing a noncontent aspect of expression, we are ready to consider
how anonymity should be analysed under section 2(b).
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An Analytical Framework For
Anonymity

W

hen analysing anonymity under section 2(b),
there is no reason to depart from the general
Irwin Toy framework, which is as follows: The first question is whether the activity in issue falls within the scope
of section 2(b). The second question is whether section 2(b) is violated. The third question is whether a
violation of section 2(b) can be saved under section 1.
It is at the scope stage of section 2(b) that the case
law is least clear. The approach to scope should respect
content-neutrality, though the scope can be narrowed to
exclude some aspects of anonymity. The two-step
Ramsden approach suggests that the first question must
be: Is the underlying activity expressive? Anonymity only
exists as an aspect of an underlying activity, but not all
activities are expressive. A particular use of anonymity
should not be protected by section 2(b) if it is related to a
non-expressive activity.
The Ramsden two-step approach indicates that a
non-content aspect of expression will not fall within the
scope of section 2(b) merely because it is related to an
expressive act. More is required. The nature, costs, and
benefits of anonymity suggest that anonymity can undermine free expression. Where this occurs, it would be
illogical to hold that anonymity falls within the scope of
section 2(b). The decisions of Lamer C.J. and McLachlin
J. in Commonwealth allow the exclusion of some aspects
of anonymity from the scope of section 2(b). This can be
done in a content-neutral fashion, which does not
undermine free expression, by holding that anonymity
will only fall within the scope of section 2(b) if it promotes, allows, or has some beneficial impact upon an
expressive activity.
As an example of how this approach would apply,
the Internet has been used by murderers to find their
victims. Such individuals are able to evade the police,
and potentially commit additional crimes, because of the
difficulties involved in tracking someone through the
Internet. Such individuals use anonymity to commit
crimes. Let us assume the Criminal Code is amended,
allowing the police to apply ex parte for a warrant
requiring an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to disclose
the identity of a user. Let us assume further that such a
warrant can only be issued if: (1) The police are investigating a serious violent offence, and (2) the police can
establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the
user committed the violent offence. Such a scheme
limits anonymity, because it allows the police to break
the cloak of anonymity by obtaining the warrant, and
the anonymous activity involves expression. Despite this,
the legislation actually protects Internet users and promotes free expression. Internet users are more likely to
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express themselves freely if they know there are laws
designed to protect them from violent Internet
predators. As such, this particular aspect of anonymity
(the right to anonymous Internet use by a person suspected on reasonable and probable grounds of having
committed a serious violent offence), would be excluded
from the scope of section 2(b), because it does not promote expression.
In the above example, you will note that in concluding that the anonymous activity does not promote
free expression, I have considered both the interests of
the listeners (Internet users in general), and the interests
of the rights-claimant speaker (the person reasonably suspected of having committed the violent offence). This
represents a departure from the traditional Irwin Toy
analysis, as confirmed in Keegstra, in which the interests
of society were not considered at the scope stage of
section 2(b) analysis. I justify this departure on several
grounds. First, the Supreme Court has not placed an
absolute requirement that one consider only the interests of the rights claimant during section 2(b). This is
demonstrated by the violence exception, which can only
be justified theoretically if the interests of listeners can be
taken into account, and by the approach taken by Lamer
C.J. and McLachlin J., in Commonwealth, which implicitly considers interests other than those of the rights
claimant. Thus, my suggested analysis has a basis in current case law. Second, the Supreme Court’s model of
expression is weak at the section 2(b) stage of analysis. As
the communication theory model demonstrates, communication is a process, rather than a discrete event.
Divorcing the speaker’s interests from the listener’s interests cannot be justified when one person’s expressive
activity undermines another person’s expressive activity.
Thirdly, anonymity is double-edged. Whether it helps or
hinders expression can only be determined on a case-bycase basis. The nature of anonymity requires that we
consider the impact on the free expression rights of both
listeners and speakers.
So far, I have only considered the method of analysis
that would be adopted when anonymity is not part of
the content. When anonymity is content, a two-step
approach will not work. The only way to respect the
principle of content-neutrality is to hold that where anonymity is content, it will always fall within the scope of
section 2(b). The sole exception to this would be if the
impact of the anonymous-expressive activity on
another’s expressive activity is so severe that the net effect
of the anonymous-expressive activity is to undermine
expression. An example of how this might occur is provided by the situation discussed earlier involving Mr.
Bungle. As such, the test at the scope stage should vary
depending on how closely the anonymity is linked with
expression.
This approach I suggest is summarised as follows. If
the anonymity is content, anonymity automatically falls
within the scope of section 2(b). If the anonymous aspect
of an activity is not content, a two-step approach to scope
could be adopted which asks: (1) Is the act expressive?
and (2) Does the non-content aspect of expression promote or allow the expressive activity? This approach has

the advantage of being content-neutral. It modifies, but
does not reject, the two-step Ramsden approach, and it
follows the principle established in Commonwealth —
that the scope of section 2(b) can be narrowed by
excluding some non-content aspects of expression. Most
importantly, it denies protection to anonymity when
anonymity undermines expression. This approach, incidentally, could also be applied to the analysis of public
fora and other non-content aspects of expression.
At the violation stage of the section 2(b) analysis,
Irwin Toy is binding authority and has to be followed by
future courts when dealing with anonymity. Having said
this, assuming an aspect of anonymity promotes expression, this does not mean that a limitation on anonymity
will automatically violate section 2(b). Before applying
the Irwin Toy analysis, we must remember that anonymity exists in various degrees, and in various forms.
Governments have a variety of tools to use in regulating
anonymity, and do not have to choose between perfect
anonymity and no anonymity. Some tools may limit
anonymity to such an extent that the expressive activity
is hindered. Other tools may have no perceptible effect
on expressive activity.
Under the Irwin Toy analysis, if a limitation is purposefully intended to limit expression by distinguishing
between acceptable and unacceptable messages, a section 2(b) violation will occur. If the limitation merely has
the effect of limiting expression, the Charter claimant
must demonstrate that the expression supports one of
the values underlying freedom of expression to establish
a section 2(b) violation. A ban on anonymous messages
criticising the government would be a limitation on anonymity that is purposefully aimed at limiting the content
of expression. Such a purposeful limitation would always
violate section 2(b). However, legislation requiring ISPs
to link legal identity and IP addresses on the public
domain would be a content-neutral limitation on anonymity that would have an effect of limiting expression.
In such a case, the Charter claimant would have to show
that the content of expression supports one or more of
the values underlying section 2(b) before a limitation is
shown. The issues raised by anonymity do not challenge
this part of the Irwin Toy framework.
Where a limitation is content-neutral, a violation of
section 2(b) should not be assumed merely because a
limitation on anonymity exists. This is because even if
anonymity does promote the expressive activity, a limitation on anonymity will not necessarily discourage that
activity. When dealing with content-neutral limitations,
the burden lies on the Charter claimant to demonstrate
a violation. This means a claimant would need to
demonstrate that a limitation on anonymity also limits
the expressive activity, in addition to demonstrating that
the expressive activity promotes one of the section 2(b)
values. As with the scope stage, the court will have to
consider the link between anonymity and content
before deciding whether a limitation on anonymity violates section 2(b). As an example, in regulating SLAPP
suits, the government could choose to introduce legislation that makes it difficult for plaintiffs to force ISPs to
disclose a user’s legal identity. The regulation could allow
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legal identity to be disclosed in certain circumstances,
and as such, would limit anonymity. However, the test
could be so strong that only the most blatant acts of libel
and slander will result in disclosure. The strength of the
test could actually encourage anonymous users to
express themselves freely because they know that their
identities are not likely to be disclosed. As such, the
anonymity falls within the scope of section 2(b), because
it promotes free expression, but the limitation on anonymity does not discourage free expression, and as such
no section 2(b) violation occurs.

Conclusion

A

nonymity may arise in any number of different
expressive activities, and the effects of anonymity on
expression will vary from case to case. Anonymity may
help expression, hinder expression, or have no perceptible effect on expression. Historically, anonymity has
been vital to freedom of expression, allowing the promulgation of new ideas when the world seeks to silence
the speaker. As a result, anonymity can undoubtedly be
protected under section 2(b) of the Charter, though this
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does not mean that anonymity must be protected in
every case.
The Supreme Court’s model of expression ignores
the fact that much of communication, and much of
expression, is a transactional process that involves the
integrated activity of actors (speakers and listeners), and
the components of expression. This flaw creates a
number of difficulties when analysing expression, particularly when one person’s expressive activities will undermine another’s. The nature of anonymity means that the
Supreme Court’s model must be developed. It is not
possible to analyse anonymity without considering the
impact of anonymity on the interests of both speakers
and listeners. It should not be assumed that anonymity
promotes expression, or that a limitation on anonymity
harms expression. Anonymity should only fall within the
scope of section 2(b) when (1) the activity is expressive,
and (2) the anonymity promotes the expressive activity,
or when the anonymous aspect is expressive in and of
itself. A limitation on anonymity should only violate
section 2(b) where the Charter claimant can demonstrate that the limitation on anonymity also limits the
expressive activity.
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